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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON
CHOICE OF LAW: THE PERSPECTIVE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL GENERALISM
Robert A. Sedler*
INTRODUCTION

When conflict of laws commentators consider the matter of constitutional limitations on choice of law, it seems that they usually
approach it from what may be called a "conflicts perspective" - a
perspective that assumes constitutional limitations on choice of law
are necessary to promote "conflicts justice" and to accommodate the
conflicting interests of states in a federal system. They then find such
limitations inhering in the due process' and full faith and credit
clauses 2 of the Constitution.3 The debate among conflict of laws
commentators concerns the extent of and the respective roles of the
due process and full faith and credit clauses in imposing constitutional limitations.4
* Professor of Law, Wayne State University. A.B., 1956, J.D., 1959, University of
Pittsburgh.
1. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1: "No State shall . .. deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law . ... "
2. Id. art. IV, § 1: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public
Acts, Records and judicial Proceedings of every other State."
3. See generally Kirgis, The Roles of Due Process and Full Faith and Credit in Choice
of Law, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 94 (1976); Martin, ConstitutionalLimitations on Choice of
Law, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 185 (1976); Martin, PersonalJurisdictionand Choice of Law, 78
MICH. L. REV. 872 (1980); Reese, Legislative Jurisdiction,78 COLuM. L. REv. 1587 (1978);
Simson, State Autonomy in Choice of Law: A Suggested Approach, 52 So. CAL. L. REV. 61
(1978). This assumption is typified by Professor Martin's observation to the effect that
"[p]rogress lies with more limitation, not less, and with a requirement that in applying its own
law the state give proper regard to the interests of other states." Martin, ConstitutionalLimitations on Choice of Law, supra, at 230.
4. Compare Martin, ConstitutionalLimitations on Choice of Law, supra note 3, with
Kirgis, supra note 3. See generally Martin, A Reply to ProfessorKirgis, 62 CORNELL L. REV.
151 (1976). The late Brainerd Currie contended that the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause and the privileges and immunities clause of article 4 should be construed as
prohibiting "unconstitutional discrimination" in choice of law. See B. CURRIE, SELECrED EsSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 445-583 (1963). It was my opinion, even prior to Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981), that the Supreme Court would not be willing to find
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Conflicts commentators do 'not approach the matter from a

"constitutional perspective," or as I would put it, from the perspective of constitutional generalism. The perspective of constitutional
generalism considers constitutional structure and doctrine and general principles of constitutional interpretation, and applies these to
constitutional limitations on choice of law. Under this approach, it is
not assumed that the Constitution imposes limitations on the power
of state courts to make choice-of-law decisions simply because such
limitations are necessary to promote "conflicts justice" or to accommodate the conflicting interests of states in a federal system. Rather,
the fundamental inquiry is whether such limitations properly can be
found to inhere in particular provisions of the Constitution. Constitutional generalism considers the broad, organic purpose and function 5
of the due process and full faith and credit clauses as well as the
"original understanding" of the framers" and the doctrines the Court
has developed in applying these provisions in other contexts. Should
these constitutional clauses be interpreted as placing any limitations
on the power of state courts to make choice of law decisions, and if
so, what should those limitations be? As stated above, this inquiry
differs from the perspective with which conflict of laws commentators have generally approached the matter of constitutional limitaconstitutional limitations on choice of law inhering in the equal protection and privileges and
immunities clauses, Sedler, Interstate Accidents and the Unprovidedfor Case: Reflections on
Neumeler v. Kuehner, I HOFSTRA L. REV. 125, 144-45 (1973), and it should be most clear
after Hague that the Court will not be willing to do so.
5. The "broad, organic purpose" of a constitutional provision refers to the fundamental
objective that the framers sought to achieve by including that provision in the Constitution.
Where governmental action occurring at some time subsequent to the adoption of a constitutional provision is inconsistent with its broad, organic purpose, such action will be declared
unconstitutional regardless of whether the framers thought it would be unconstitutional when
the constitutional provision was adopted. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967)
(state antimiscegenation law unconstitutional as advancing no valid governmental purpose, independent of racial discrimination, because object of fourteenth amendment was to eliminate
discrimination regardless of whether framers of fourteenth amendment understood that it
would prohibit antimiscegenation laws).
6. The "original understanding" of the framers refers to the historical meaning of a
particular constitutional provision and to the result that the framers would have intended that
provision to require. See, e.g., Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 86-103 (1970) (framers did
not intend that sixth amendment's guarantee of "trial by jury" necessarily required that jury
consist of twelve persons); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964) (framers intended by
adoption of article 1, section 2, that apportionment of representation in United States House of
Representatives should be based strictly on principle of equal representation for equal numbers
of people, so that congressional districts of unequal population are proscribed by article 1,
section 2).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol10/iss1/4

2

Sedler: Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law: The Perspective of C
CONSTITUTIONAL

1981]

GENERALISM

tions on choice of law.7
Similarly, the Supreme Court's decisions in this area, including
the recent decision in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague,8 do not focus
sufficiently on the analysis suggested by the perspective of constitutional generalism. The Court treats conflicts issues as if the matter
of constitutional limitations on choice of law is an independent "specialized" area 9 not to be dealt with in terms of general principles of
constitutional interpretation and the consistent application of constitutional doctrine. For example, the Court's treatment of due process
as a limitation on choice of law has generally taken place without
regard to the Court's application of substantive due process doctrine
in other areas. The Court has also assumed that the full faith and
credit clause imposes limitations on the power of state courts to
make choice-of-law decisions without explicitly considering whether
it is properly the function of the full faith and credit clause to impose such limitations. 10 What has happened, then, is that conceptually, and in practice, the matter of constitutional limitations on
choice of law has developed as an independent "specialized" area of
constitutional law rather than within the framework of constitutional
generalism.
In this article I demonstrate that when constitutional limitations
on choice of law are approached from the perspective of constitutional generalism, the Constitution should be interpreted as placing
only the most minimal limitations on the power of state courts to
make choice-of-law decisions, and that in our constitutional system
there should not be any significant constitutional limitations on
choice of law."'
The article begins by considering the rise and fall of constitutional limitations on choice of law in an historical context and shows
that this rise and fall paralleled exactly the rise and fall of substantive due process as a significant limitation on governmental economic
regulation. This analysis indicates that the historical explanation for
imposing constitutional limitations on choice of law was that such
7. See authorities cited notes 3-4 supra.
8. 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
9. See G. STUMBERG, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 232-36 (3d ed. 1963).
10. See generally Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586

(1947).
11.

I also demonstrate that the likely effect of the Court's holding in Allstate Ins. Co. v.

Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981), and of the doctrine subscribed to by five Justices in that case will
be to place only the most minimal limitations on the power of state courts to make choice-oflaw decisions.
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limitations were considered necessary by the Court to protect "freedom of contract" from "improper" state court interference, just as
the Court was protecting "freedom of contract" from "improper"
governmental economic regulation. I then discuss the Court's current
approach to constitutional limitations on choice of law, as reflected
in the Hague decision, and show that under that approach it is not
likely that there will be any significant constitutional limitations on
choice of law. Most importantly, I analyze constitutional limitations
on choice of law from the perspective of constitutional generalism
and demonstrate that when analyzed from this perspective there
should not be any significant constitutional limitations on choice of
law. Indeed, in my view the only circumstances in which a state
court's decision to apply its own law in a case containing a foreign
element should be declared unconstitutional are circumstances in
which a court would choose not to apply its own law in any event.
THE RISE AND FALL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON CHOICE
OF LAW: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

Significant limitations on the power of state courts to make
choice-of-law decisions were first imposed by the Supreme Court in
the early part of the twentieth century during what may be called
the "Dodge era.. "12 In the middle 1930's, the Court's approach to
limitations on choice of law began to change,' 3 and by the early
1960's, its approach could properly be characterized as one of "judicial abstention." 4 It seems clear, looking to the results of the
Court's decisions, that a state's law constitutionally could be applied
to any case where (1) that state had an interest in applying its law
12. So named after New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357 (1918). Other
major cases invalidating state court choice-of-law decisions in this era were: John Hancock
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Delta
& Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143 (1934); Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145
(1932); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930); Modern Woodmen of Am. v. Mixer, 267
U.S. 544 (1925); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken, 266 U.S. 389 (1924); New York Life Ins.
Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149 (1914).
13. See Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935). The
turnaround became clearer in Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306
U.S. 493 (1939).
14. See, e.g., Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 '(1964); Carroll v. Lanza, 349
U.S. 408 (1955). I tend to put great emphasis on the Supreme Court's "institutional behavior," whicb refers to the pattern of results reached by the Court in the cases coming before it
for decision. The Court's institutional behavior evolves over a period of time and is not necessarily fully consistent with the doctrine articulated by the Court to explain the basis of its
decisions. The "law" of the Constitution may generally be considered a reflection of the interaction between the Court's institutional behavior and its articulated doctrine.
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on the point in issue in order to implement the policy reflected in its
law, and the application of its law in the circumstances presented
was not fundamentally unfair to the party against whom the law was
applied, or, (2) that state had sufficient factual contacts with the
underlying transaction making it reasonable for its law to be applied
without regard to the state's "substantive" interest 15 in doing so. 16
Since the Supreme Court had given the states wide "constitutional
latitude" in their power to make choice of law decisions, the state
courts generally were not concerned with constitutional limitations
17
on choice of law.
Of particular interest to those who work in both the fields of

Constitutional Law and Conflict of Laws is that the rise and fall of
constitutional limitations on choice of law occurred within the same

time period and closely paralleled the rise and fall of substantive due
process as a significant limitation on governmental economic regulation. The "Lochner era,"1' s characterized by the Court's invalidation

of a number of state and federal economic regulatory laws, 9
spanned the early part of the twentieth century. In the middle

1930's, Supreme Court decisions indicated a change in the Court's
approach,20 and by the late 1930's the Lochner era was over.2 1 By
15. By "substantive interest" is meant the state's interest in applying its law in order to
implement the policy reflected in that law.
16. I saw the interest-and-fairness test as being supported by Clay v: Sun Ins. Office,
Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964), and the factual-contacts test as being supported by Carroll v.
Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955). I have also maintained that it was fully constitutional for the
plaintiff's home state, under the interest-and-fairness test, to apply its own law allowing recovery where the plaintiff was injured in an out-of-state accident with a defendant from a nonrecovery state, notwithstanding that the accident had no factual connection with the forum.
Sedler, The TerritorialImperative: Automobile Accidents and the Significance of a State
Line, 9 DuQ. L. REV. 394, 402-04 (1971). In Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981),
a majority of the Court specifically indicated that the application of the law of the plaintiff's
home state in this situation was constitutional. See notes 71-72 infra and accompanying text.

See generally R. CRAMTON & R.
§ 13.1000 (1977).

SEDLER, THE SUM AND SUBSTANCE OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

17. See R. CRAMTON & R. SEDLER, supra note 16, at § 13.1330. The Supreme Court
had last granted plenary review in a case involving a question of constitutional limitations on
choice of law in Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964), and it had denied review in
other cases where the choice-of-law result clearly seemed to be unconstitutional under existing
standards. See de Lara v. Confederation Life Ass'n, 257 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 1971), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 953, 954-56 (1972) (Brennan and Douglas, J.J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
18. So named after Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (state law forbidding
bakery employees from working more than 60 hours a week or 10 hours a day violative of due
process).
19. For a review of these cases and their subsequent overruling, see W. LOCKHART, Y.
KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 439-41 (5th ed. 1980).
20. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (state law fixing minimum milk
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the early 1960's, it was clear that the Court's approach to the constitutionality of governmental economic regulation as a matter of due
process had become one of judicial abstention. 2
The parallel between the rise and fall of constitutional limitations on choice of law and the rise and fall of substantive due process
as a significant limitation on governmental economic regulation is by
no means coincidental. Substantive due process was the primary doctrinal vehicle by which the Supreme Court invalidated state court
choice-of-law decisions in the "Dodge era."2 3 In every case in which
the Supreme Court invalidated a state court choice-of-law decision,
there was a contractual relationship between the parties. The Supreme Court's decisions protected "contractual rights" as established
by the law of the state where the contract was "made. 24 In other
words, during the period when the Court was using substantive due
process to protect business enterprises from what it considered to be
"improper" governmental economic regulation, it was also using substantive due process, and in some cases, full faith and credit,25 to
protect business enterprises from what it considered to be "improper" state court choice-of-law decisions interfering with their
"contractual rights." Thus, the Court's application of due process
doctrine in the choice-of-law context was fully consistent with its application of due process doctrine in the economic regulation context.
The Court's decisions in both contexts emphasized a "freedom of
contract" value that the Court found to be embodied in substantive
prices not violative of due prwcess).
21.

See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (federal statute

excluding "filled milk" from interstate commerce not violative of due process); West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (state law regulating women's wages not violative of
due process).
22. See McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation
and Reburial, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 34, 38.
23. While John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178, 181-83 (1936), was

expressly decided on full faith and credit grounds, this case, as Justice Stevens noted in Hague,
is "best understood as a due process case." 449 U.S. at 321 n.4 (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment). See generally notes 146-149 infra and accompanying text.

24. In all of these cases, the challenge to the state court choice-of-law decision was made
by an insurance company or an employer, and the choice-of-law decision allegedly interfered
with the "contractual rights" by invalidating the contractual provision relied on, or by ignoring
it (as in Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932)). See cases cited note 12
supra.
25. The Court's use of full faith and credit to "complement" due process in invalidating

state court choice-of-law decisions may be likened to the Court's "commerce clause" decisions
in the "Lochner era," where the Court invalidated federal regulatory legislation as not being

within the commerce power of Congress. See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251
(1918) (overruled in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 103 (1941)).,
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due process.
The consistent application of due process doctrine in both contexts is illustrated by the striking similarity of the rationale and language of the Court's opinions in the economic regulation cases and
in the choice-of-law cases. First, let us compare Lochner v. New
York 2" and New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge.17 When the Court
invalidated the New York hours of employment law in Lochner, it
stated:
It seems to us that the real object and purpose were simply to regulate the hours of labor between the master and his employ6s (all
being men, sui juris), in a private business, not dangerous in any
degree to morals or in any real and substantial degree, to the
health of the employ6s. Under such circumstances the freedom of
master and employ6 to contract with each other in relation to their
employment . . . cannot be prohibited
or interfered with, without
28
violating the Federal Constitution.
When the Court invalidated Missouri's application of its nonforfeiture statute to a "New York contract" in Dodge, it stated:
Under the laws of New York, where the parties made the loan
agreement now before us, it was valid; also it was one which the
Missouri legislature could not destroy or prevent a citizen within its
borders from making beyond them by direct inhibition. . . . As
construed and applied by the . . . [state court] § 7897 transcends
the power of the State. To hold otherwise would permit destruction
of the right - often of great value - freely to borrow money upon
a policy from the issuing company at its home office and would,
moreover, sanction the impairment of that liberty of contract guaranteed to all by the Fourteenth Amendment.29
The parallel between the Court's reversal in its view of the constitutionality of governmental regulation as a matter of due process and
the reversal in its view of the constitutionality of a state court's application of its own law as a matter of due process is also illustrated
by comparing the rationale and language in contemporary opinions
in both areas. In Nebbia v. New York,30 where the Court upheld a
milk price-fixing scheme designed to increase the income of milk
producers, the Court stated:
26.
27.

198 U.S. 45 (1905).
246 U.S. 357 (1918).

28.

198 U.S. at 64.

29.

246 U.S. at 376-77.

30.

291 U.S. 502 (1934).
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So far as the requirement of due process is concerned, and in the
absence of other constitutional restriction, a state is free to adopt
whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote
public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to
its purpose. The courts are without authority either to declare such
policy, or, when it is declared by the legislature, to override it. If
the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper
legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory,
the requirements of due process are satisfied .... Il
Similarly, in Alaska Packers Association v. Industrial Accident
Commission,2 the Court upheld the application of California's
workers' compensation act to a transient worker who signed on in
and was to return to California, despite a contractual stipulation
binding the worker to the Alaska workers' compensation law. The
Court stated:
California . . . had a legitimate public interest in controlling and
regulating this employer-employee relationship in such fashion as
to impose a liability upon the employer for an injury suffered by
the employee and in providing a remedy available to him in California. . . Indulging the presumption of constitutionality which
attaches to every state statute, we cannot say that this one, as applied, lacks a rational basis or involved any arbitrary or unreasonable exercise of state power ...
Nor did the State of California exceed its constitutional power
by prohibiting any stipulation exempting the employer from liability for the compensation prescribed by the California statute. Legislation otherwise within the scope of acknowledged state power,
not unreasonably or arbitrarily exercised, cannot be condemned because it curtails the power of the individual to contract. As the
state had the power to impose the liability in pursuance of state
policy, it was a rational, and therefore a permissible, exercise of
state power to prohibit any contract in evasion of it.33
In other words, once the Court stopped protecting freedom of
contract from governmental economic regulation, it likewise stopped
protecting freedom of contract from state court choice-of-law decisions that applied forum law to invalidate contractual provisions and
defeat "contractual expectations." At the time when the Court's approach to the constitutionality of governmental economic regulation
31.

Id. at 537.

32. 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
33. Id. at 542-43 (citations omitted).
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under the due process clause was one of judicial abstention, it was
likewise completely unwilling to invalidate state court choice-of-law
decisions."'
We have seen, then, that the rise and fall of constitutional limitations on choice of law paralleled exactly the rise and fall of substantive due process as a significant limitation on governmental economic regulation. It is reasonable to conclude the Court's essential
objective during the Dodge era of protecting business enterprises
from what it considered improper interferences with freedom of contract was the same as its objective in imposing significant limitations
on the power of the government to enact economic regulation during
the Lochner era. Once the Court ceased using substantive due process to protect business enterprises from governmental economic regulation, it likewise ceased imposing constitutional limitations on
choice of law to protect business enterprises from state court choiceof-law decisions interfering with "freedom of contract."
The rise and fall of constitutional limitations on choice of law in
an historical context indicates, at least from the perspective of constitutional generalism, that significant constitutional limitations on
choice of law should be considered aberrations. They should be seen
as the product of an earlier era when the Court was interpreting the
Constitution in a manner that it has since repudiated. 5 Just as it is
now recognized that the due process clause does not operate to impose any significant limitations on the power of the government to
enact economic regulation, it should be recognized that the due process and full faith and credit clauses do not operate to impose any
significant limitations on the power of state courts to make choice-oflaw decisions. The Court's 1964 decision in Clay v. Sun Insurance
Office,36 which gave the states wide constitutional latitude in their
choice-of-law decisions, and its subsequent refusal until Hague to
grant review in any cases involving constitutional challenges to state
court choice-of-law decisions, 7 reinforces the view that the Court's
34. Compare Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964) with Ferguson v.
Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 732-33 (1963) (where Court upheld constitutionality of state law
prohibiting all but lawyers from engaging in business of debt-adjusting).
35. As the Court stated in Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963): "The doctrine
that prevailed in Lochner. . . and like cases-that due process authorizes courts to hold laws

unconstitutional when they believe the legislature has acted unwisely-has long since been
discarded. We have returned to the original constitutional proposition that courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies . .. .
36. 377 U.S. 179 (1964).
37. See discussion in note 17 supra.
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approach to constitutional limitations on choice of law was one of
judicial abstention. 8 It was generally assumed that a state court did
not have to be concerned about whether its choice-of-law decision
was constitutional any more than a state legislature had to be concerned about whether its regulation of economic activity would be
subject to a successful due process attack. When analyzed from the
perspective of constitutional generalism, such an assumption is surely
correct.
THE Hague DECISION
In Hague, the Court granted certiorari to "determine whether
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Full
Faith and Credit Clause of Art. IV, § 1, of the United States Constitution bars the Minnesota Supreme Court's choice of substantive
Minnesota law." 9 By so doing, it departed from its judicial abstention approach and necessarily revived the matter of constitutional
limitations on choice of law. Why, may it be asked, did it do so?
Recognizing, of course, that inquiry into the Court's motivation for
granting certiorari in a given case is necessarily speculative,'0 I suggest two possible reasons why the Court may have decided that it
should again consider what limitations, if any, the Constitution imposes on the power of state courts to make choice-of-law decisions.
First, while the notion that substantive due process should operate as
a significant limitation on governmental economic regulation has
now been generally discredited,'1 this has not been true of the notion
38. The last time that the Court had held a state court's choice-of-law decision to be
unconstitutional because violative of full faith and credit was in Order of United Commercial
Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586, 588-89, 624-25 (1947), where in a 5-4 decision it held that,
as a matter of full faith and credit, the law of the state where a fraternal benefit association
was incorporated had to determine the validity of a "built-in" limitation provision contained in
an insurance policy issued to a member. In Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179, 183
(1964), the Court characterized Wolfe as a "highly specialized decision dealing with unique
facts," and it is doubtful if it would be followed today. See discussion in notes 157-161 infra
and accompanying text.
39. 449 U.S. at 304 (citations omitted).
40. As to the Court's granting certiorari because of the "importance" of the issues involved, see R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 284-300 (5th ed. 1978).
For a general discussion of the reasons why the Supreme Court denies certiorari, see Maryland
v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912, 917-20 (1950) (opinion of Frankfurter, J., respecting denial of petition for writ of certiorari).
41. Few, if any, constitutional law commentators will be found who advocate the revival
of substantive due process as a limitation on governmental economic regulation. Indeed, the
academic debate is over whether substantive due process should be used at all to invalidate
governmental action interfering with personal liberty and individual property rights. Compare,
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that there should be constitutional limitations on choice of law. Most
conflict of laws commentators maintain that there should be some
constitutional limitations on choice of law, and the academic debate
is over how extensive these limitations should be. 42 The courts have
always given great weight to the views of academic commentators in
conflicts cases, 4 a and the academic insistence that there should be
constitutional limitations on choice of law may have had some influence on the Court's decision to grant certiorari in Hague.
Second, and likely to have been of greater influence, in recent
years the Court has acted to define more precisely the permissible
due process limits for the exercise of judicial jurisdiction. 44 Constitutional limitations on the exercise of judicial jurisdiction and constitutional limitations on the application of a state's substantive law seem
to be related in the sense that the same considerations that determine whether it is constitutionally permissible for a state to exercise
judicial jurisdiction may also be relevant in determining whether it is
constitutional for a state to apply its own substantive law in the same
45
case.
e.g., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 11-41 (1980) with Perry, Abortion, the Public
Morals, and the Police Power: The Ethical Function of Substantive Due Process, 23
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 689, 720-21 (1976).
42. See authorities cited note 3 supra.
43. E.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. at 306-07, 308 n.l1, 311 n.14 (plurality
opinion).
44. In my view, the effect of the Court's decisions in this area has been to impose limitations at the outer reaches of the permissible exercise of jurisdiction. Sedler, Response to Conflict of Laws Dialogue (to be published in Hastings Law Journal (1981)).
45. For example, whenever a state may constitutionally exercise jurisdiction under a
long-arm statute the same reasons that make the exercise of such jurisdiction reasonable (and
hence, constitutional) also render constitutional the application of that state's substantive law
in the case. See Sedler, JudicialJurisdictionand Choice of Law: The Consequences of Shaffer
v. Heitner, 63 IowA L. REV. 1031, 1032 (1978). It has been argued that just as a state must
have "minimum contacts" so as to be able to exercise judicial jurisdiction as a matter of due
process, it must also have "minimum contacts" so as to be able to apply its own substantive
law as a matter of due process. Martin, PersonalJurisdictionand Choice of Law, supra note
3, at 872, 879-83. It has also been argued that an expansion of the permissible limits for the
exercise of judicial jurisdiction correlatively must limit the circumstances in which the forum
should be able to apply its own substantive law. Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an
Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 33, 97-101 (1978).
Justice Brennan has stated: "[T]he decision that it is fair to bind a defendant by a State's
laws and rules should prove to be highly relevant to the fairness of permitting that same State
to accept jurisdiction for adjudicating the controversy." Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 22425 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). As the Court has emphasized, however, the tests for determining the constitutionality of the exercise of judicial jurisdiction and the application of a state's substantive law are not fully co-extensive. See, e.g.,
Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 98 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 215. As to
the relationship between the constitutionality of the exercise of jurisdiction and the constitu-
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The Court's recent tendency to define the permissible due process limits for the exercise of judicial jurisdiction may have influenced its decision to grant certiorari in Hague in order to explicate
more precisely what limitations the due process and full faith and
credit clauses impose on the power of state courts to make choice-oflaw decisions.
There were three opinions in Hague, and the Court split 5-3 on
the question of whether the application of Minnesota law in that
case by the Minnesota Supreme Court was constitutional. 46 Doctrinally, both the plurality opinion of Justice Brennan, 47 joined by Justices White, Marshall and Blackmun, and the dissenting opinion of
Justice Powell, 48 joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, treated the tests under due process and full faith and credit to
be coextenstive. Only Justice Stevens, in a concurring opinion, expressly drew a distinction between due process and49 full faith and
credit as constitutional limitations on choice of law.
The Brennan plurality stated the constitutional test as follows:
"[F]or a State's substantive law to be selected in a constitutionally
permissible manner, that State must have a significant contact or
significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that
choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair." 50
Applying that test, the plurality concluded that the application of
Minnesota law on the issue of stacking coverage under the policies
was fully constitutional. 1 Justice Brennan identified three contacts
that Minnesota had with the parties which, in the aggregate, rendered constitutionally permissible the application of Minnesota law
on the question of stacking. They were: (1) the decedent's regular
employment in Minnesota and his daily commute to his Minnesota
workplace while covered by the uninsured motorist provisions of the
insurance policies; (2) Allstate's doing of business in Minnesota and
Minnesota's interest in regulating Allstate's relationship with a longtime member of the Minnesota workforce; (3) the widow's post-occurrence change of residence to Minnesota and her position as the
decedent's court-appointed representative.5 2 Justice Brennan stated
tionality of the application of a state's substantive law, see discussion in Sedler, supra note 44.
46. Justice Stewart did not participate. 449 U.S. at 320.
47. 449 U.S. at 307-20 (Brennan, J., joined by White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.).
48. Id. at 332-36 (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 320-32 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
50. Id. at 312-13.
51. Id. at 320.
52. Id. at 313-19.
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in conclusion: "In sum, Minnesota has a significant aggregation of
contacts with the parties and the occurrence, creating state interests,
such that application of its law was neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair." 53
Justice Stevens took the position that a choice of law would violate due process only if it were totally arbitrary or fundamentally
unfair, and specifically rejected the notion that the due process question was affected in any way by Minnesota's "interest" in applying
its own law." He found no unfairness to Allstate in the application
of Minnesota law since the policy provided for coverage throughout
the United States and it was foreseeable that the law of states other
than Wisconsin could govern particular claims arising under the policy. 55 Further, Justice Stevens contended that full faith and credit, in
certain instances, required that one state respect the sovereignty of
another state and refrain from applying its own law.5" He concluded,
however, that Wisconsin's sovereignty could not be infringed by applying Minnesota law, because the insurance policy's coverage of accidents occurring in other states deprived Wisconsin of any interest
in insisting that the contract be interpreted in accordance with Wisconsin law.57
The dissenters, in an opinion by Justice Powell, stated that they
agreed with the doctrinal position of the Brennan plurality, but disagreed with its application to the facts of the present case. 58 It appears, however, that the dissenters' characterization of their doctrinal position as to constitutional limitations on choice of law is not
completely in line with the plurality's. Justice Powell maintained
that in order to apply its own law constitutionally the forum state
must have a legitimate policy interest in the outcome of the litigation" and concluded that the application of Minnesota law did not
reasonably further a legitimate state interest.60 Justice Powell appears to be saying that the state must have an "interest" as that
term is used in the interest analysis approach to choice of law under which the state must be interested in applying its law in order
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 320 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 331 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 326-31 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).

56. Id. at 322-23 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
57.

Id. at 323-26 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).

58. Id. at 332 (Powell, J., dissenting).
59.
60.

Id. at 334 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id. at 336-39 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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to implement the policy reflected in that law.61 Justice Brennan, on
the other hand, appears to be using the concept of "interest" more
broadly,6 2 to include the "generalized interest" of a state in applying
its law on the basis of the factual contacts that the parties and the
transaction have with the state. s Although Justice Powell would not
say that it was unconstitutional for a state to apply its own law
where that state had significant factual contacts with the underlying
transaction,64 he appears to be demanding a more qualitative kind of
interest than is demanded by Justice Brennan, either in terms of the
state's factual contacts with the underlying transaction, or in terms
of the state's interest in applying its law in order to implement the
policy reflected in that law.6 5
To a constitutional law scholar, the formulation, by both the
plurality and concurrence, 8 of the doctrine applicable to constitutional limitations on choice of law, as well as the application of the
doctrine to the facts of Hague, seems to place fairly minimal limitations on the power of state courts to make choice-of-law decisions.
The "significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts" test,
as defined and applied by the Brennan plurality, 7 makes clear that
the forum can apply its own law either on the basis of factual contacts with the underlying transaction or on the basis of its interest in
applying its own law in order to implement the policy reflected in
61. Id. (Powell, J., dissenting). As to the meaning of "interest" for the purposes of interest analysis, see Sedler, The Governmental Interest Approach to Choice of Law: An Analysis
and a Reformulation, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 181, 194-204 (1977).
62. See 449 U.S. at 313-20.
63. For example, the state where the accident occurred has a general interest in applying its law to determine liability arising from the accident. See, e.g., Carroll v. Lanza, 349
U.S. 408 (1955). The application of that state's law to determine liability in the particular
case may not advance the policy reflected in that law, such as where that law would deny
recovery and both the plaintiff and the defendant are from a recovery state. See Schiltz v.
Meyer, 29 Ohio St. 2d 169, 280 N.E.2d 925 (1972) (Ohio guest statute applies to bar suit in
which two parties from Kentucky, a non-guest statute state, were involved in accident in
Ohio).
64. Justice Powell specifically stated that if the accident had occurred in Minnesota,
Minnesota law constitutionally could be applied. 449 U.S. at 336 (Powell, J., dissenting).
65. Justice Powell also maintained that the state's interest in applying its own law had
to be determined at the time the accident occurred rather than in light of post-occurrence
events. 449 U.S. at 336-37 (Powell, J., dissenting).
66. In order for constitutional doctrine to be binding on the lower courts and on the
Court itself in future cases, the doctrine must command the support of five Justices. The binding constitutional doctrine that emerges from Hague, then, is that which is consistent with
both the Brennan and Stevens formulations.
67. See test accompanying notes 50-53 supra.
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that law.6 8 Justice Stevens would allow the application of the forum's
law as a matter of due process in any case as long as this would not
be fundamentally unfair to the other party. 9 He also indicated that
the circumstances under which full faith and credit would invalidate
a choice of law otherwise valid as a matter of due process, were
fairly limited.7 0 Both the Brennan 1 and Stevens72 opinions support
the proposition that as a matter of due process, the plaintiff's home
state constitutionally can apply its own law to allow recovery where
the plaintiff is injured in an out-of-state accident having no factual
connection with the forum.
Further, both opinions make clear that from a constitutional
standpoint, a state's interest in the application of its own law can be
determined in light of post-occurrence changes as long as this produces no fundamental unfairness to the party against whom the law
is being applied. 73
The Powell dissent disagreed on this point.7 4 In its view, Minnesota lacked a legitimate state interest because the insured was a
Wisconsin resident at the time of the fatal accident and the accident
did not occur in Minnesota. If the fatal accident had occured in
Minnesota, the Court would unanimously have agreed that Minne76
sota could constitutionally apply its own law on the point in issue.
68.

In my view, this was the operational test prior to Hague as well. See discussion in

notes 13-17 supra and accompanying text.
69.

See 449 U.S. at 326 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).

70. See id. at 326-27 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). This view is illustrated
by his holding on the full faith and credit question in that case, as well as by his formulation of

full faith and credit doctrine. See Id. at 322-26 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
71.

See 449 U.S. at 314. As Justice Brennan stated: "An automobile accident need not

occur within a particular jurisdiction for that jurisdiction to be connected with the occurrence." Id. A valid state contact creating state interest can occur in other ways: "The injury or
death of a resident of State A in State B is a contact of State A with the occurrence in State
B." Id. at 315 n.20.
72. See id. at 328-30 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). Since ordinarily no un-

fairness will result to the defendant or the insurer in this situation, Justice Stevens would find
the application of the law of the plaintiff's home state valid as a matter of due process. Id. at

331 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). I have long maintained this position and am
pleased to see that it has now been endorsed by the Supreme Court. See Sedler, supra note 16,
at 402-04. Courts that have applied their own law in this situation have assumed that they
could do so without any constitutional objection, even prior to Hague. See, e.g., Turcotte v.
Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d 173 (1st Cir. 1974); Schwartz v. Consolidated Freightways Corp.
300 Minn. 487, 221 N.W.2d 665 (1974).
73. See 449 U.S. at 318-19 (plurality opinion), 331 (Stevens, J., concurring in the

judgment).
74. See id. at 337 (Powell, J., dissenting).
75. See id. at 337-39 (Powell, J., dissenting).
76. Since the occurrence of an accident is within a state, and presumably the making of
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Finally, since all but Justice Stevens said the constitutional tests
for applying a state's law under due process and full faith and credit
are coextensive, it is reasonable to assume that ordinarily full faith
and credit will not be an independent constitutional limitation on
choice of law."
It is submitted, therefore, that the holding and doctrinal formulations in Hague reinforce the previously existing operational test for
determining the constitutionality of a state court's choice of law.
Thus, a state's law may constitutionally be applied in any case where
(1) the state had an interest in applying its law on the point in issue
in order to implement the policy reflected in that law, and the application of its law in the circumstances presented was not fundamentally unfair to the party against whom the law was applied; or (2)
the state had sufficient factual contacts with the transaction making
it reasonable for its law to be applied to the transaction despite its
lack of a substantive interest in doing So. 7 8 Now that the Court has
explicated more precisely the nature of the limitations that the due
process and full faith and credit clauses impose upon the power of
state courts to make choice-of-law decisions, the Court may again
return to its approach of judicial abstention. In any event, it seems
clear that the effect of the Court's holding in Hague, and of its doctrinal formulation of constitutional limitations on choice of law, is to
place only the most minimal limitations on the power of state courts
to make choice-of-law decisions.
THE PERSPECTIVE OF CONSTITUTIONAL GENERALISM

The Need for This Perspective
Although I approve of the result in Hague and of what will
most likely be the effect of the doctrine formulated in the Brennan
and Stevens opinions, I am nonetheless troubled by the failure of the
Court to deal with constitutional limitations on choice of law from
the pprspective of constitutional generalism; that is, from a perspeca contract is within a state, each is sufficient "constitutional contact" to sustain the application
of a state's law. Thus the choice-of-law rules of the traditional approach are immune from a
due process or full faith and credit attack. This was generally recognized by the commentators
prior to Hague. See, e.g., Reese, supra note 3, at 1600.
77. The only case where the Court had held that a choice of law that was valid as a
matter of due process was violative of full faith and credit was Order of United Commercial
Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947), and it is doubtful if that case would be followed
today.
78. See discussion in notes 14-17 supra and accompanying text.
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tive emphasizing constitutional structure, doctrine and general principles of constitutional interpretation. All of the opinions in Hague
appear to treat constitutional limitations on choice of law as a specialized area and to approach choice-of-law questions independent of
general principles of constitutional doctrine.7 9 For example, all the
opinions focus on due process as a limitation on choice of law, but
there is no discussion whatsoever of the relationship between general
due process doctrine and due process as a limitation on choice of
law. Nor is there mention of the Court's application of due process
doctrine in other contexts.80 From an analytical standpoint, it seems
that constitutional limitations on choice of law still remain removed
from the constitutional mainstream.
Because the Court has failed to deal with constitutional limitations on choice of law from the perspective of constitutional generalism, it is likely that Hague will intensify rather than mute the academic debate over constitutional control of choice of law. In their
search for constitutional limitations on choice of law, many of my
Conflict of Law colleagues will probably scrutinize Brennan's "significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state
interests" ' language, as if it were a talismanic 'test for determining
whether a state court's choice of law would be found unconstitutional.82 Similarly, there is likely to be close scrutiny of Powell's dissent in order to identify cases where the Brennan plurality and the
Powell dissenters might agree that a particular choice of law is unconstitutional. Moreover, I expect there will be renewed debate over
whether full faith and credit should be an independent limitation on
choice of law, as contended by Justice Stevens, 83 and if so, when a
state court's choice of its own law improperly impinges on the sovereignty of another state. I believe the Court was sending out a behav79.

The only cases discussed in any of the opinions are the "leading" cases dealing with

constitutional limitations on choice of law and the more recent cases involving due process
limitations on the exercise of judicial jurisdiction. See, e.g., 449 U.S. at 309-13 (plurality

opinion), 322-25 (Stevens, J.,concurring in the judgment), 332-36 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
80.

My Constitutional Law colleagues were astonished, for example, that Justice Rehn-

quist concluded that the choice-of-law decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court violated due
process, since Justice Rehnquist has inveighed against the use of substantive due process to
invalidate governmental action. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 71719 (1977) (Rehnquist, J,,
dissenting); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 173-77 (1973) (Rehnquist,
J.,dissenting).

81.

449 U.S. at 313.

82.

This test conveniently ignores the "neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair" part

of the formulation.
83.

449 U.S. at 322-23 (Stevens, J.,concurring in the judgment).
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ioral message"4 that there are few, if any, significant constitutional
limiations on choice of law and that courts should generally abstain
from considering such questions. This message is not as loud and
clear as it would have been, however, had the Court dealt with constitutional limitations on choice of law from the perspective of constitutional generalism. When viewed from the perspective of constitutional generalism, the due process and full faith and credit clauses
properly should be interpreted as imposing only the most minimal
limitations on the power of state courts to make choice-of-law
decisions.
Due Process
Structurally, the due process clause operates as a potential limitation on the power of state courts to make choice-of-law decisions,
in the same manner as it operates as a limitation on the power of
courts to take any action in the civil litigation process. The due process clause is applicable to any governmental action affecting property interests. In resolving private disputes in the civil litigation process, courts necessarily affect property rights.8 5 Thus, the procedural
component of due process imposes limitations on the exercise of judicial jurisdiction by the courts 6 and requires that the litigants receive
fair notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to defend.8 7 Its
substantive component, theoretically at least, could render a court's
substantive disposition of a case violative of due process as well.88
From the perspective of constitutional generalism, the most important step in the analysis of due process as a limitation on choice
of law is to relate the Court's application of general due process doctrine in other contexts to due process as a limitation on choice of
law. The fundamental question is whether, in light of general due
84. "Behavioral message" refers to the results that the Supreme Court indicates it
wants the lower courts to reach in light of its decision in a particular case or series of cases.
For an example of a behavioral message in another context, see Sedler, Metropolitan Desegregation in the Wake of Milliken - On Losing Big Battles and Winning Small Wars: The View
Largely From Within, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 535, 575-76.
85. A court's rendition of a judgment in civil litigation involving private parties constitutes state action for constitutional purposes. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14-18 (1948).
86. See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-19 (1945).
87. See, e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313-15
(1950).
88. Therefore, it is proper, from the perspective of constitutional generalism, to assume
that constitutional limitations on choice of law do inhere in the due process clause, and the
issue is framed in terms of what those limitations should be. This is not so with respect to the
full faith and credit clause.
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process doctrine and the principles that the Court applies to determine whether governmental action is violative of due process in other
contexts, due process should impose any limitations on the power of
state courts to make choice-of-law decisions, and if so, what those
limitations should be.
In determining the constitutionality of governmental action
challenged as being violative of due process, the Court has articulated a two-tier standard of review. Where the challenged governmental action impinges on a fundamental right, such action must
advance a compelling governmental interest that cannot be advanced
by a less restrictive alternative than the restriction in question.89
Where the challenged governmental action does not impinge on a
fundamental right, its constitutionality as a matter of due process is
tested under the purportedly less restrictive rational basis standard:
The restriction in question must be reasonably related to the advancement of a legitimate governmental interest.90 Despite the
Court's articulation of a two-tier standard of review, the Court may
in practice be using a sliding-scale approach, under which the degree
of scrutiny of the governmental action varies depending upon the importance of the individual interest in relation to the importance of
the asserted governmental interest.91 In any event, whether the
Court actually follows a two-tier or a sliding-scale standard of review, actions taken by a state court in the civil litigation process or89.

See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).

90. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envt'l Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 82-83 (1978);
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
91. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). There the Court
struck down a housing ordinance that limited occupancy to narrowly defined single families on

substantive due process grounds because the State's legitimate interest in preventing overcrowding and minimizing congestion did not justify intrusion into family living arrangements.
The Court's examination of the ordinance went beyond the rational-basis test, since the Court
conceded that the State's purpose was achieved, although marginally, by the ordinance. Id. at
500. But the Court also stopped short of calling the underlying right "fundamental." Instead,

the Court compared the importance of the underlying right (the right to have members of the
extended family live in the same house) to the importance of the State's objective (avoiding

overcrowding), id. at 499, and found that the State's interest, although legitimate, was outweighed by the importance of the family relationship. Id. at 504-06.

In Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973), there was a challenge to a Connecticut statute
that permanently classified students as nonresidents for tuition purposes if they resided out of
state for a certain period prior to their application. In finding the statute violative of the Con-

stitution on due process grounds, the Court's analysis went beyond the rational-basis test,
though the Court did not classify the underlying right as fundamental. Id. at 452-53.

The middle-tier level of constitutional review occurs most frequently in equal protection
cases. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (statute requiring that males be older

than females in order to purchase beer held violative of equal protection clause).
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dinarily do not invoke a heightened degree of scrutiny.92 The general
due process doctrine that would be applicable to determine the constitutionality of state court choice-of-law decisions, therefore, is the
rational-basis test. Under that test, it must be established whether
the government "has acted in an arbitrary and irrational way" so as
to violate due process, or whether it has acted reasonably and
fairly.9 3
The considerations in determining whether the government has
acted in an arbitrary or irrational way are reasonableness and fairness.9 4 When a state has some factual connections with the underlying transaction, the choice of that state's law to govern rights and
liabilities arising from that transaction would seem to be reasonable,
notwithstanding that another state may have even more factual connections with that transaction. Likewise, when application of a
state's law to a given factual situation advances the policy reflected
in that law, it surely seems reasonable for a court to hold that that
state's law should apply, again notwithstanding that another state
may appear to have a "greater interest."95 While the consideration
92. A heightened degree of scrutiny would only be required in cases that involve "fundamental rights," such as the right to divorce. Cf. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971)
(state may not bar divorce action because of inability to pay filing fees).
93. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envt'l Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 83-84 (1978). The
arbitrary and irrational test, it will be recalled, is the due process test formulated by Justice
Stevens in Hague, 449 U.S. at 326 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment), as well as, in
part, by the Brennan plurality, id. at 307-13. It will be remembered that Justice Brennan
imposed an additional requirement that there be a "significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests." Id. at 313. It may be asked whether Justice Brennan
intended that this language convey something beyond the arbitrary and irrational test, or
whether he intended that the two components of the formulation be related to each other. The
exact language of the formulation was as follows: "[F]or a State's substantive law to be selected in a constitutionally permissible manner, that State must have a significant contact or
significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law is
neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair." Id. at 312-13.
94. This is most clearly illustrated by the Court's application of the arbitrary and irrational test in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envt'l Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 84-93 (1978).
Profess6r Weintraub makes the same point in regard to due process as a limitation on choice
of law:
When, then, is it a denial of due process to apply the law of a state to an interstate
transaction? The safest, but not very helpful, answer is when it is not reasonable to
apply the law of that state. Reasonableness is the basic, core concept of due process.
Any further elaborations of this "reasonableness" standard are attempts to give this
vague standard more specific content in order to facilitate its application to specific
cases.
R, WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 9.2A, at 505 (2d ed. 1980).
95. This assumes that it can be determined that one state's interest in the application of
its law is "greater" than that of another state.
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of fairness is more frequently involved with respect to procedural due
process, 96 it may also be involved with respect to substantive due
process. A state rule of substantive law that interferes with the enjoyment of liberty or property interests in a fundamentally unfair
way may be found to be violative of substantive due process.97 Fairness to the parties is an independent choice-of-law consideration,
particularly where consensual transactions are involved.98 Where the
choice of a state's law in the circumstances presented unfairly
defeats the legitimate expectations of a party, it would be consistent
with general due process doctrine to hold that the choice of law is
violative of due process. It is submitted that the constitutionality of a
particular choice of law should be governed by the reasonableness
and fairness test. A choice of law should not be held to be violative
of due process unless, under the circumstances presented, the application of -the law of the chosen state is clearly unreasonable or fundamentally unfair to one of the parties.
If the constitutionality of a state court's choice-of-law decision,
as a matter of due process, is tested against the arbitrary and irrational standard, neither the purported interest of the other involved
state in having its law applied nor the purported multistate concerns
should play any part in the constitutional analysis. Another state's
apparently "greater interest" in having its own law applied, or multistate concerns dictating that the law of that state apply instead of
the law of the forum, does not make the application of the forum's
law unreasonable or unfair. If the application of the forum's law is
not unreasonable or unfair, due process has been satisfied.
Cases from Alaska Packers through Clay that rejected due process challenges to state court choice-of-law decisions are easily explainable in terms of the reasonableness and fairness criteria. In all
of these cases, the underlying transaction had factual connections
with the forum, and the forum had at least a generalized interest in
applying its law on the basis of those factual connections. 99 Simi96. "Fundamental fairness," of course, lies at the heart of due process limitations on the
exercise of judicial jurisdiction. In the final analysis, the constitutional question in such cases
revolves around whether the court that seeks to exercise jurisdiction is a "fair forum." Kulko v.
Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 100 (1978).

97. See, e.g., Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 446-54 (1973) (statutory conclusive presumption that student whose legal address was outside of state at time of enrollment in pub-

licly-supported university remains nonresident throughout period of enrollment is violative of
due process).
98. See Sedler, supra note 61, at 222.

99. See Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 413 (1955) (discussing forum's "generalized"
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larly, because of the factual connections with the underlying transaction, the party against whom the law was applied could have reasonably foreseen the application of the forum's law on the point in issue,
and thus the application of that law could not have been fundamentally unfair to that party.'00 In all of these cases, had it not been for
the legacy of the Dodge era, and had constitutional limitations on
choice of law not been an independent specialized area, there would
not even have been a serious question as to the constitutionality of
the state court's choice-of-law decision. 101 In no case could it seriously be contended that by choosing to apply its own law on the
point in issue, the state court had acted in an arbitrary and irrational
way.
Let us now consider Hague in light of general due process doctrine. Hague differs from the other cases in that the underlying
transaction had no factual connection with the forum. The vehicle
was registered and insured in Wisconsin, 2 and the accident occurred in Wisconsin.' 03 The application of Minnesota law in Hague,
however, like the application of the law of the forum in all of the
cases from Alaska Packers through Clay, is consistent with general
due process doctrine in that there is a reasonable basis for the application of Minnesota law, and the application of Minnesota law was
not fundamentally unfair to Allstate.
To simplify the analysis of Hague in light of general due process doctrine, let us assume that the Minnesota legislature had enacted the following statute: 04
Uninsured Motorist Coverage: Aggregation
interest in applying its own law).
100. For a discussion of the relationship between "contacts" and "fairness," see Clay v.
Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179, 181-82 (1964); Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance
Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 70-72 (1954).
101. The Court seemed to be trying to make this point in Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd.,
377 U.S. 179, 181-83 (1964). As to the legacy of the Lochner era in regard to due process as a

limitation on governmental economic regulation, see North Dakota State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc., 414 U.S. 156, 164-67 (1973).

102. Since this was so, the accident would be charged to Wisconsin's loss experience
regardless of where it occurred, so that the defendant was a Wisconsin insurer for choice-oflaw purposes.
103. As stated previously, if the accident had occurred in Minnesota, there would be no
question that Minnesota law constitutionally could have been applied. See discussion in note
76 supra and accompanying text. See generally Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 412-13
(1955).

104. The statute has been drafted to incorporate the factual situation presented in
Hague.
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(1) Whenever an automobile liability insurance policy contains a
provision for uninsured motorist coverage and more than one vehicle is included within the coverage of the policy, the coverage limits
for each automobile shall be aggregated, and in the event of an
accident involving an uninsured motorist, the insured shall be entitled to recover the aggregate sum.
(2) The provisions of this statute shall apply to automobile policies issued by insurance companies licensed to do business in this
state in the following circumstances:
(a) One or more of the insured automobiles is registered in this
state;
(b) Although none of the insured automobiles is registered in this
state, either:
(i) The insured was regularly employed in this state at the
time of the accident in question and regularly drove one of the insured automobiles to and from the workplace in this state; or
(ii) Subsequent to the occurrence of the accident, the insured, or in the event of the insured's death due to accident, the
insured's spouse or dependent minor child, has established permanent residence in this state.
The statute controls the disposition of Ms. Hague's claim against
Allstate, pursuant to both parts of subsection (b), and the statute
must be applied by the Minnesota courts unless such application
would be unconstitutional. 10 5 Assume Allstate in this hypothetical
challenges such application as being violative of due process.
In light of general due process doctrine, it is clear that the challenge must fail. Under the rational basis standard of review, the application of the statute to the disposition of Ms. Hague's claim, as
directed by subsection 2(b), is not arbitrary or unfair. A key factor
making the application of the statute reasonable for due process purposes is that it regulates an automobile liability insurance contract
that was issued by an insurance company licensed to do business in
Minnesota. Since Allstate has availed itself of the privilege of doing
business in Minnesota, Minnesota has wide latitude in regulating the
business activities of Allstate where those business activities impact
on Minnesota interests. 10 6 Subsection (2)(b) limits the application of
105. A state court must follow a legislative directive as to choice of law, like any other
statutory provision, assuming that it is constitutional.
106. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980) (corporation availing itself of privilege of conducting business in state subjects itself to jurisdiction of
that state). Since this is so, Allstate can constitutionally be subject to the exercise of judicial
jurisdiction in Minnesota, and is on notice that Minnesota substantive law could be applied to
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the statute to those circumstances where Minnesota may properly
assert an interest in allowing a higher level of recovery on the insurance contract. In light of subsection 2(b), it is reasonable for Minnesota to be concerned about the welfare of the insured, a member of
the Minnesota work force, and the insured's dependents, and this
gives Minnesota a constitutionally sufficient "interest" in applying its
law to determine the amount of recovery under the insurance contract. Under 2(b)(i), Minnesota has limited any possible assertion of
interest to a situation where the insured regularly drove one of the
insured vehicles to and from the Minnesota workplace. Although
Minnesota's interest here may not be as strong as it would be if the
decedent had been a resident of Minnesota,1 07 it is of sufficient
strength to make the application of Minnesota law reasonable for
due process purposes. Minnesota's interest in applying its law becomes even stronger, however, under 2(b)(ii), where the insured or
the insured's dependents become residents of Minnesota. Minnesota
is now affected by the social and economic consequences of the accident in which the insured was involved.108 For these reasons, it cannot be disputed that under the hypothetical statute, the application
of Minnesota law to the kind of factual situation presented in Hague
satisfies the due process test of reasonableness.
It is equally clear that the application of Minnesota law to this
situation satisfies the due process test of fairness. Precisely because
Allstate does business in Minnesota, it cannot claim unfair surprise
by being made subject to the requirements of Minnesota insurance
law. 109 Nor can it properly claim the protection of Wisconsin law so
as to put its activities beyond Minnesota's regulatory reach.110 Moreregulate its business actitivies that had an impact in Minnesota.
107. But it is at least as "strong" as the interest of the forum in Carroll v. Lanza, 349
U.S. 408 (1955), where the forum applied its law to allow recovery to a nonresident who was
injured there while working for a subcontractor, but who had no other connection with that
state.
108. Its interest in this regard is the same as if the insured had been a resident of
Minnesota at the time of the accident.
109. As to the absence of "unfair surprise" on the part of an automobile liability insurer
in any event, see R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 94, § 6.5, at 272-73.
110. The hypothetical Minnesota statute does not require Allstate to do anything that it
is prohibited from doing by Wisconsin law. Moreover, since the Minnesota statute treats foreign insurance companies in exactly the same manner as it treats domestic insurance companies, it does not discriminate against interstate commerce. Nor does it burden interstate commerce by preventing the movement of Wisconsin-insured vehicles into Minnesota. Thus, the
application of the Minnesota statute to determine the liability of the Wisconsin-based insurer
does not violate the commerce clause. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437
U.S. 117, 125-29 (1978).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol10/iss1/4

24

Sedler: Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law: The Perspective of C
19811

CONSTITUTIONAL

GENERALISM

over, any claim of unfairness is completely obviated by the fact that,
under Wisconsin law, Allstate was required to cover the insured's
vehicles while they were being driven in other states and thus could
anticipate the application of another state's law on the issue of
stacking.""
The above analysis in terms of general due process doctrine does
not differ significantly from the analysis of the Brennan plurality in
Hague."2' The plurality opinion stated: "In sum, Minnesota had a
significant aggregation of contacts with the parties and the occurrence, creating state interests, such that application of its law was
neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair."' ' 3 General due process
doctrine focuses on whether the application of Minnesota law is arbitrary or fundamentally unfair, rather than on sufficient aggregation
of contacts or state interests, but the conclusion in a particular case
is not likely to differ under either formulation. This is because, as
pointed out previously, whenever the underlying transaction has a
factual connection with the forum, or whenever the forum has an
interest in applying its law in order to implement the policy reflected
in that law, the application of the forum's law is not arbitrary, and
in those circumstances, it is not likely to be fundamentally unfair
either.
The analysis of the Powell dissent, however, is completely inconsistent with an analysis in terms of general due process doctrine. The
Powell dissent contended that due process required that there be
"reasonable policy-related contacts in choice-of-law cases,""" and
concluded that such contacts were lacking here. Allstate's doing of
business in Minnesota was not a sufficient contact, according to Justice Powell, because this did not give Minnesota an interest in regulating the conduct of the insurer unrelated to property, persons or
contracts executed in Minnesota." 5 Justice Powell also stated that it
did not matter that the insured was a member of the Minnesota
workforce, because allowing additional recovery under an insurance
contract to a nonresident member of the Minnesota workforce does
111. Justice Stevens emphasized this in Hague. See text accompanying notes 54-57
supra. Our hypothetical Minnesota statute has been enacted on the assumption that, under the
laws of all the states, automobile liability insurance policies must cover the vehicle whenever it
is driven into another state.
112. While Justice Stevens' due process analysis focuses on "fairness," it presumably

incorporates "reasonableness" as well.
113. 449 U.S. at 320 (footnote omitted).
114. Id. at 340 (Powell, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 337-38 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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not "further any substantial state interest relating to employment." ' 6 Finally, Justice Powell argued that post-occurrence
changes of residence and the resulting interest on the part of Minnesota in applying its own law, could not be taken into account because
this would encourage forum-shopping, and would permit the defendant's reasonable expectations at the time the cause of action ac11 7
crued to be frustrated.
None of Justice Powell's points show why the application of
Minnesota law to the factual situation presented in Hague was arbitrary or unfair. The requirements that Justice Powell would have the
due process clause impose on a state court's power to make choiceof-law decisions are not the kind of requirements that the due process clause, under the rational-basis standard of review, has been
found to impose on governmental action in other contexts. The rational-basis standard of review requires only that the state show a
legitimate interest in enacting particular legislation or in undertaking particular action, not that the interest be substantial 19 or of a
certain quality. Minnesota clearly has a legitimate state interest in
regulating an automobile liability insurance contract when a vehicle
regularly driven to and from a Minnesota workplace is covered by an
insurance company doing business in Minnesota. Likewise, Minnesota has a legitimate interest in regulating liability under such a contract where the insured or the insured's dependents subsequently become Minnesota residents and the social and economic consequences
of the accident will be felt in Minnesota. This interest does not become any less legitimate under the rational-basis standard of review
simply because it might encourage forum-shopping. 119 Further, although applying Minnesota law on the point in issue might defeat
Allstate's expectations at the time the cause of action accrued, this
produces no unfairness since Allstate was not entitled to expect the
application of Wisconsin law on the question of stacking at the time
120
it entered into the contract or while the contract was in force.
116.

Id. at 339 (Powell, J., dissenting).

117.

Id. at 337 (Powell, J., dissenting).

118. The "substantial interest" test applies only when a higher standard of review is
invoked. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155-56, 162-64 (1973); Poe v. Ullman, 367
U.S. 497, 541-43, 548-55 (1961) (Harlan, J.,dissenting).

119.

Under the rational-basis standard of review, it would be said that it was reasonable

for the legislature to "choose to pay the price of forum-shopping" in order to advance an
otherwise legitimate state interest.
120. Justice Powell explicitly recognized this. 449 U.S. at 336-37 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
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The analysis of the Powell dissent appears to proceed on the
assumption that the matter of due process limitations on choice of
law is a specialized area 121 divorced from general due process doctrine. Unlike the Brennan-Stevens view, the Powell analysis may
lead to results inconsistent with general due process doctrine. It is
incumbent on the dissenters, therefore, to show why due process as a
limitation on choice of law should be a specialized area and why the
due process clause should be used to invalidate state court choice-oflaw decisions that would otherwise pass constitutional muster under
the rational-basis standard of review. This the dissenters do not do.
In contrast, the operational test formulated in the Brennan and Stevens opinions for determining the constitutionality of a state court's
choice-of-law decision is consistent with general due process doctrine. The likely effect of that operational test is to place only the
most minimal limitations on the power of state courts to make
choice-of-law decisions. This is the conclusion that should be drawn
from an analysis in terms of general due process doctrine.
We may now consider under what circumstances a state court's
choice-of-law decision should, under general due process doctrine, 122
be found arbitrary and fundamentally unfair and thus violative of
due process. The application of a state's law to govern liability in
civil litigation should be held arbitrary for due process purposes only
where that state does not have an interest in applying its law in order to implement the policy reflected in that law or where that state
does not have a significant factual connection with the underlying
transaction, making it reasonable to apply the law of that state on
the point in issue.123 The application of a state's law should be held
unfair only where (1) the party against whom the law is applied
could not reasonably have foreseen its application to the transaction
in question at the time the party entered into the transaction, and
(2) the party conformed its conduct to the requirements imposed by
the law of another state, in justifiable reliance that the state's law
would apply to the transaction.1 24 In either of these situations, it is
highly unlikely that any present-day court would choose to apply its
121.
122.

See notes 8-10 supra and accompanying text.
This, in my view, will produce the same result as the operational test contained in

the Brennan and Stevens formulations in Hague.
123. If neither criterion is satisfied, there is simply no rational basis for the application
of that state's law.
124. For a discussion of this point, see 449 U.S. at 333 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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own law; 125 the forum will generally stop short of applying its own
law before the permissible limits of due process have been reached.
Thus, we would not expect, under this formulation, that a state
court's choice-of-law decision would be found violative of due
process.
In Hague, the Court briefly discussed the two "classic" cases,
Home Insurance Co. v. Dick1 26 and John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Yates,1 27 both decided in the 1930's, where, a state
court's choice of law was held to be unconstitutional. 2 8 The Court
noted that both cases were "instructive as extreme examples of selection of forum law,"1 29 and that in both cases, "the seleedtion of forum
law rested exclusively on the presence of one nonsignificant forum
contact." 13 0 The Court stated:
Dick and Yates stand for the proposition that if a State has
only an insignificant contact with the parties and the occurrence or
transaction, application of its law is unconstitutional. Dick concluded that nominal residence-standing alone-was inadequate;
Yates held that a postoccurrence change of residence to the forum
state - standing alone - was insufficient to justify application of
forum law.131
The results in Dick and Yates serve to illustrate where a state court's
choice of law would be "arbitrary" or "unfair" under general due
process doctrine. They also illustrate why those circumstances are
extremely limited and unlikely to occur in practice.
In Dick, a Mexican company issued a fire insurance policy, containing a built-in one year statute of limitations, 3 2 to Bonner, a resident of Mexico. The policy was assigned, in Mexico, to Dick, a
125.

In practice, courts generally will not apply their own law where they conclude that

the policy reflected in that law will not be significantly advanced by its application in the
circumstances presented. See Sedler, supra note 61, at 222-27. Where the forum has a real
interest in applying its law on the point in issue, the application of its law is not likely to be
fundamentally unfair to the other party. Conversely, the same factors that would produce possible unfairness in the application of a state's law often will also indicate the lack of a real
interest in applying that law. Id. at 222.
126.
127.

281 U.S. 397 (1930).
299 U.S. 178 (1936).

128. While John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936), was decided on full faith and credit grounds, id. at 183, the result can be explained on due process
grounds. See discussion in notes 146-149 infra and accompanying text.
129.

449 U.S. at 311.

130. 'Id. at 309.
131. Id. at 310-11 (footnote omitted).
132. 281 U.S. at 403 n.l.
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Texas citizen residing temporarily in Mexico. 133 The policy covered
the vessel only when used in certain Mexican waters, required that
the premium be paid in Mexico, and was expressly made subject to
Mexican law.134 The built-in limitations provision was valid under
Mexican law, but invalid under Texas law.
Dick, of course, could not arise on its precise facts today because the insurer in that case did not do business in Texas and jurisdiction was obtained by the now unconstitutional method of garnishing the reinsurance obligation of the New York reinsurer which was
doing business in Texas. 135 Let us, however, change the facts in Dick
to have the insurance company conducting business in Texas, making it subject to jurisdiction there. Further, to eliminate any other
possible jurisdiction problems, let us assume Dick is the original
owner of the vessel and a true resident of Texas.
If the case were to arise today on these facts, it is difficult to
believe that Texas would choose to apply its law, as it did in Dick,
on the issue of the validity of the built-in limitations. The policy behind the Texas rule of substantive law is primarily a transactionregulating policy rather than a people-protecting policy. Texas is not
trying to protect a class of persons from its own improvidence when
engaging in contractual transactions; rather, it is trying to regulate
the kinds of provisions that can be contained in insurance contracts. 13 6 Texas has no interest in applying this regulatory policy to a
contract of risk insurance executed in Mexico and covering the vessel
only when it is used in certain Mexican waters. 37 Nor will there be
133. Id. at 403-04.
134. Id. at 403 & n.2.
135. The Court noted this in Hague. 449 U.S. at 310 n.12.
136. A law embodies a transaction-regulating policy when its purpose is to control how
certain transactions should be conducted. A state that has a statute of frauds, for example, has
decided that it will not enforce contracts unless the parties have shown that they are sufficiently serious about their transaction to embody their understanding in a certain formalized
manner. Similarly, if a state voids built-in limitation periods that are contained in contracts, it
has decided that it does not want parties to be able to limit the enforcement of contractual
obligations in this way. A law embodies a people-protecting policy when its purpose is to protect a class of persons, such as minors or spendthrifts, from the consequences of their improvidence by prohibiting them from entering into enforceable transactions. For a discussion of
transaction-regulating policy, see Sedler, On Choice of Law and the Great Quest: A Critique
of Special Multistate Solutions to Choice-of-Law Problems, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 807, 827-28
(1979).
137. A state's interest in applying its law to implement a transaction-regulating policy is
premised on significant factual contacts with the underlying transaction rather than on the
residence of any party in that state. See, e.g., Pallavicini v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 41
A.D. 2d 66, 341 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1973), affd, 34 N.Y.2d 913, 316 N.E.2d 722, 359 N.Y.S.2d
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any significant social or economic consequences in Texas if the Texas
plaintiff cannot obtain insurance recovery for the loss of a vessel
used only in Mexican waters. 13 8 Thus, Texas does not have a real
interest in applying its law on the point in issue and, I contend,
would not do so. 139
If Texas were to apply its own law on the point in issue, however, such application would be "arbitrary" and thus violative of due
process. This is because, as pointed out above, Texas does not have
an interest in applying its law in order to implement the policy reflected in that law, and because it does not have any factual connection with the underlying transaction making it reasonable for Texas
to apply its law on the point in issue.
The plaintiff's residence in Texas is not a sufficient factual connection making it reasonable for Texas to assert an interest in allowing the plaintiff to recover on a contract of risk insurance covering a vessel that was used only in Mexico. 140 Although the insurance
company does do business in Texas, its activity with respect to the
matter in issue, unlike the situation in Hague, does not affect any
Texas interests. In Hague, the vehicles covered by the insurance pol290 (1974); Sedler, supra note 136, at 829-31. On the other hand, where a law embodies a
people-protecting policy, the home state of the party sought to be protected has an interest in
applying its law to any transaction involving that party, even if it is connected entirely with
another state. See Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 239 Or. 1, 395 P.2d 543 (1964); Potlatch No. I Fed.
Credit Union v. Kennedy, 76 Wash. 2d 806, 459 P.2d 32 (1969). There is no unfairness in
applying the law of a party's home state on the issue of a party's competency to engage in a
contractual transaction, since application of the law of the incompetent party's home state, on
this issue, could have been foreseen at the time the parties entered into the contract.
138. A different situation would result, for example, if the plaintiff could not obtain
insurance recovery for an automobile accident occurring in another state.
139. In a case such as Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 239 Or. 1, 395 P.2d 543 (1964), for
example, if the defendant had asserted a statute of frauds defense under Oregon law rather
than the defense of spendthrift immunity, the Oregon court probably would not have applied
Oregon law on the point in issue and would have rejected the defense because an important
Oregon policy would no longer be at issue. See id. at 16, 395 P.2d at 549. For a discussion of
the general principles involved here, see Sedler, Characterization,Identification of the Problem Area and the Policy-Centered Conflict of Laws: An Exercise in Judicial Method, 2 RUT.CAM. L.J. 8, 83-84 (1970). Cf. Bernkrant v. Fowler, 55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d 906 (1961)
(California declined to apply its statute of frauds to void oral contract, valid in Nevada, involving refinancing of obligations involving sale of Nevada land to Nevada residents even though
vendor may have been domiciled in California when contract was made).
140. This is because the denial of recovery on a contract of risk insurance covering property only when it is being used in another state will not produce any social or economic consequences in Texas. But since denial of recovery to a Texas resident on a liability insurance
contract would produce social and economic consequences in Texas, Texas can properly assert
an interest in applying its law to allow recovery on that contract, notwithstanding that the
accident occurred in another state or that the contract was "centered" in that state.
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icy were regularly driven by the insured to his Minnesota workplace,
while here the insurance policy covered the vessel only while it was
being used in certain Mexican waters. For these reasons, the application of Texas law to invalidate the built-in limitation period in this
modern variant of Dick would be arbitrary and violative of due
process.1 4
In Yates, however, Georgia's application of its law to the question of insurer liability was not arbitrary because Georgia had a real
interest in applying its law. In Yates, a life insurance policy was applied for, issued, and delivered in New York.142 The beneficiaries of
the policy, however, moved to Georgia shortly after the insured's
death. 14 3 At issue was which state's law - New York's or Georgia's
should apply to determine whether false representations made on
a life insurance application should bar recovery.144 The insurance
policy contained the insured's statement that he had not been treated
for any illness for the five-year period prior to making his insurance
application. Undisputed testimony showed that the insured had received medical treatment five times within one month of the application. Under New York law, the entire contract between the parties
had to be embodied in the policy itself, while Georgia law permitted
the jury to consider parol evidence showing that the insured truthfully answered all questions, but that the insurance agent incorrectly
45
recorded the answers on the application."
Once the beneficiaries became Georgia residents, Georgia necessarily became concerned with their welfare. Enabling the beneficiaries to recover the insurance proceeds through the application of
Georgia law advanced Georgia's policy of generally permitting recovery unless there were material false representations. This interest
is at least as strong as Minnesota's interest in Hague in applying its
law on the issue of stacking because of the spouse's post-occurrence
change of residence to Minnesota. In Yates, then, the beneficiaries'
post-occurrence change of residence to Georgia - standing alone gave Georgia a real interest in applying its law on the point in issue.
141.

This is totally apart from the question of whether the application of Texas law in

Dick would have been fundamentally unfair to the insurer. A number of commentators have

maintained that there was no unfairness in the application of Texas law in Dick. See R. WEiNsupra note 94, § 9.2A, at 502-03; Martin, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of
Law, supra note 3, at 188-91. But see Kirgis, supra note 3, at 107-09.
142. 299 U.S. at 179.
143. Id.
TRAUB,

144. Id. at 179-81.
145.

Id.
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Therefore, the application of Georgia law allowing recovery on the
insurance policy in Yates cannot be said to be arbitrary.
Georgia's application of its own law in Yates, however, was in
fact violative of due process because, under the circumstances, application of Georgia law was fundamentally unfair to the insurer. The
application of a state's law is unfair for due process purposes where
the party against whom the law is applied could not reasonably have
foreseen application of the law at the time it entered into the transaction, and conformed its conduct to the law of another state in justifiable reliance on the fact that that state's law would determine its
rights with respect to that transaction. It cannot be argued that prior
to the beneficiary's post-occurrence move to Georgia, New York law
was the only possible law applicable to the issue of the beneficiaries'
recovery under the policy. In Hague, by contrast, the insurance policy covered the vehicle in all states into which it was driven, so that
the application of the law of a state other than Wisconsin on the
issue of stacking was, at the outset, fully foreseeable to Allstate.1 46 It
is unfair to give effect to the law 'of the state of the post-occurrence
move if the conduct of one of the parties "would have been different
if the present rule had been known'and the change foreseen." 147 In
Yates, the insurer, in reliance on New York law, would assume that
it did not have to be concerned about the accuracy of the information contained in the insured's application until the insured died and
a claim was made by the beneficiaries. At that time it could assert
the provisions of New York law absolutely voiding the contract because of false representations as to medical care, whether material or
not. If the insurer had known that a different standard, such as
Georgia's material-representation standard, were applicable, presumably the insurer would have checked the application more carefully
before issuing the policy or would have taken steps to cancel the
policy at an earlier time, when proof of materiality was more likely
to have been available. The unfairness of applying Georgia law to
the point in issue in Yates is not altered by the fact that the insurer
was also doing business in Georgia because the insurer was entitled
146. This point was emphasized by Justice Stevens. See 449 U.S. at 324 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment). Likewise, in Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964),
the insured had changed his residence to Florida prior to the time the loss occurred, and since
the insurer continued the contract in effect, the insurer could have anticipated the application
of Florida law on the issue of the validity of the built-in limitation period.
147. Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 316 (1945). For a discussion of this
point, see Sedler, supra note 61, at 240.
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to assume that this life insurancecontract on the life of a New York
resident would be governed by New York law. 14 8 In the precise circumstances of Yates, then, the application of Georgia law on the
issue of the insurer's liability was so fundamentally unfair as to be
9
violative of due process.1
It does not follow, however, that it would have been fundamentally unfair for Georgia to have applied its law on a different issue in
a case such as Yates, despite the absence of contacts between the
insured and Georgia during his lifetime. Assume, for example, that
the point in issue was the validity of a suicide provision contained in
the policy, and that under New York law the insurer was not liable
in the event of suicide, while under Georgia law the suicide did not
relieve the insurer of the obligation to pay unless it occurred within
one year of the issuance of the policy. Assume further that the insured committed suicide more than one year after issuance of the
policy. Regardless of which state's law is applicable to determine the
effect of the insured's suicide at the time of the insured's death or
thereafter, there was nothing that the insurer could have done differently prior to the time of the suicide. The insurer's conduct would
not "have been different if the present rule had been known and the
change foreseen." 1 0 Since Georgia now has a real interest in applying its law on the point in issue, and since the application of Georgia
law on this point produces no unfairness to the insurer, application of
Georgia law is not arbitrary or unfair, and thus is not violative of
due process even though Georgia's only contact is the beneficiaries'
post-occurrence change of residence to Georgia.151
148. A contrary situation is presented in Hague because the insurer was not entitled to
assume that the stacking question would be determined by Wisconsin law, since the insurance
contract covered the vehicles when they were being driven in different states. In Clay v. Sun
Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964), the location of the insured risk had changed to Florida,
so the application of Florida law on the issue of the validity of the built-in limitation period
could have been anticipated prior to the time the loss occurred. And in Watson v. Employers
Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954), the application of Louisiana law on the issue of

the validity of the direct-action provision could have been anticipated, because the insured sent
its products into Louisiana.
149. For an explanation of Yates based on unfairness, see R. WEINTRAUB, supra note
94, § 9.2A, at 506; Reese, supra note 3, at 1597-98.

150. Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. at 316. For a discussion of this point, see
Sedler, supra note 61, at 241.
151.

I am thus troubled by the statement of the Brennan plurality to the effect that,

"Yates held that a postoccurrence change of residence to the forum State - standing alone -

was insufficient to justify application of forum law." 449 U.S. at 311. And while Justice Ste-

vens explained Yates primarily in terms of fundamental unfairness, he also stated that'in the
case of a life insurance contract, "it is likely that neither party would expect the law of any
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As the above discussion indicates, it is only in extreme cases
such as Dick and Yates, where the forum is not likely to apply its
own law in any event, 152 that a state court's decision to apply its own
law should be held to be violative of due process. When due process
as a limitation on choice of law is viewed from the perspective of
constitutional generalism and the question is approached in terms of
general due process doctrine, due process should not act as a significant limitation on the power of state courts to make choice-of-law
decisions.15
Full Faith and Credit
In Hague, only Justice Stevens indicated that the constitutional
test for the application of a state's law as a matter of full faith and
credit differed from the constitutional test for the application of a
state's law as a matter of due process. Justice Stevens stated the full
faith and credit limitation on choice of law to be as follows:
The Full Faith and Credit Clause is one of several provisions in the
Federal Constitution designed to transform the several States from
independent sovereignties into a single, unified Nation. The Full
Faith and Credit Clause implements this design by directing that a
State, when acting as the forum for litigation having multistate aspects or implications, respect the legitimate interests of other
States and avoid infringement upon their sovereignty. The Clause
does not, however, rigidly require the forum State to apply foreign
law whenever another State has a valid interest in the litigation.
On the contrary, in view of the fact that the forum State is also a
sovereign in its own right, in appropriate cases it may attach paraState other than the place of contracting to have any relevance in possible subsequent litigation." Id. at 325 n. 11 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). Since the new domicile of the
beneficiaries will have a real interest in applying its law to enable them to recover, the application of the law of that state should be valid as a matter of due process, so long as such application, as in our example, is not fundamentally unfair to the insurer.
152. A court following a modern approach to choice of law will not apply its own law in
any case where it does not see a real interest in doing so or where the application of its law
would be fundamentally unfair to the other party. See discussion in note 125 supra. Some
courts, however, in the absence of a borrowing statute, apply their own law on the issue of the
statute of limitations so as to allow a suit that is barred by the statute of limitations of the
state whose substantive law they are applying. Assuming that the forum has no proper basis
for the application of its own substantive law, to allow a suit that is barred by the statute of
limitations of the only interested state clearly is arbitrary and should be held to be violative of
due process. See R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 94, § 9.2B, at 516-17; Martin, Constitutional
Limitations on Choice of Law, supra note 3, at 221-23.
153. It appears that this was the intention of both the Brennan and Stevens formulations
of the constitutional test. See notes 112-113 supra and accompanying text.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol10/iss1/4

34

Sedler: Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law: The Perspective of C
1981]

CONSTITUTIONAL

GENERALISM

mount importance to its own legitimate interests. Accordingly, the
fact that a choice-of-law decision may be unsound as a matter of
conflicts law does not necessarily implicate the federal concerns
embodied in the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Rather, in my opinion, the Clause should not invalidate a state court's choice of forum
law unless that choice threatens the federal interest in national
unity by unjustifiably infringing upon the legitimate interests of another state.15
Justice Stevens concluded that there was no threat to national unity
and no violation of Wisconsin's sovereignty by the application of
Minnesota law in Hague because the insurance policy covered accidents that might occur in other states. Wisconsin, therefore, had no
interest in insuring that contracts formed in Wisconsin in reliance on
Wisconsin law be interpreted in accordance with that law. 1 5
The emphasis in Justice Stevens' analysis is on the federal interest in national unity15 6 In his view, one state is required by full faith
and credit in a choice-of-law case to respect the sovereignty of another state where failure to do so would significantly impair the federal interest in national unity. Under Justice Stevens' formulation, it
would seem to be a rare instance where a state court's application of
its own law in a conflicts case, which is valid as a matter of due
process, would be held violative of full faith and credit. Where a
state court's choice of its own law is neither so arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair as to be violative of due process, it is difficult to see
how the federal interest in national unity ordinarily would require
57
that another state's law be applied.1
Some conflicts commentators have argued for a more expansive
view of full faith and credit as a constitutional control on state court
choice-of-law decisions. They believe that when a state court makes
choice-of-law decisions, full faith and credit requires that the court
respect the sovereignty of sister states where those states have a
much greater interest in controlling the outcome of the particular
litigation.1 58 Such an approach requires a weighing and balancing of
154. 449 U.S. at 322-23 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (citations omitted).
155.

Id. at 324-26 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).

156. Id. at 324 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
157. The only time that a choice of law, valid as a matter of due process, has been held
to be violative of full faith and credit, was in Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe,

331 U.S. 586 (1947), and it is questionable whether that case would be followed today. See
discussion in note 38 supra.
158. Martin, ConstitutionalLimitations on Choice of Law, supra note 3; Simson,-supra

note 3. The seminal piece, arguing that full faith and credit should be a significant constitu-
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the strength and legitimacy of the conflicting state interests and of
the contacts that the transaction and parties have with each of the
involved states. Additionally, it precludes the application of the law
of a state whose interests and contacts are "relatively insignificant"
in comparison with those of the other involved state.1 59 One commentator has gone so far as to propose that full faith and credit requires deference to the "decisionmaking authority" of the state that
is the "most interested in influencing the outcome of the case under
review."1 0
In analyzing this position from the perspective of constitutional
generalism, the fundamental inquiry must be whether there is any
justification for interpreting the full faith and credit clause as imposing a constitutional control on state court choice-of-law decisions. 161
Such justification would have to be found by analyzing the broad
organic purpose and function of the full faith and credit clause 62 or
by analyzing the purpose and effect of the clause as found in the
original understanding of the framers.1 63
No justification for interpreting the clause as imposing a constitutional control on choice of law can be found. First, the historical
circumstances surrounding the adoption of the full faith and credit
clause make it clear that the framers would not have intended that
the clause operate as a limitation on state court choice-of-law decisions. Second, a significant limitation on the power of state courts to
make choice-of-law decisions would seem to be inconsistent with the
broad, organic purpose of the full faith and credit clause and its
function in our constitutional scheme.
It is agreed that there is nothing in the language or history of
the full faith and credit clause that indicates that the framers intended this clause to control state court choice-of-law decisions or
relate in any way to the degree of "respect due the laws of other
tional control on state court choice-of-law decisions, is Jackson, Full Faithand Credit - The
Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45 COLUM. L. REV., 1 (1945).
159. Martin, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law, supra note 3, at 211-16,
230; Simson, supra note 3, at 73-78.
160. Simson, supra note 3, at 87.
161. I am leaving aside the question of how it is to be determined whether one state has
a "much greater interest" than another state in having its law applied on the point in issue or
which state is the one that is "most interested" in influencing the outcome of the case under

review.
162. For a discussion of the meaning of "broad, organic purpose" in constitutional
analysis, see note 5 supra.
163. For a discussion of the meaning of "original understanding" in constitutional analysis, see note 6 supra.
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states."'" It has been argued, however, that notwithstanding the absence of language or history indicating this as the intention of the
framers, the original understanding of the framers supports the proposition that
the clause is most reasonably interpreted as requiring uniformity
among the various states in the laws that their courts would apply
to decide any particular case. From this perspective, the clause
broadly captures a vision of a nation in which people's legal rights
and liabilities, whether or not declared by a court to date, do not
vary according to the state in which they are placed in issue. This
interpretation of original intent derives substantial support from
two considerations. First, a legal order in which the outcome of a
case could be expected to turn on the forum in which the cause of
action is tried understandably may have offended the Framers'
sense of justice. Under this theory, the Framers opted for a unified
system of justice at least partly because they believed, as an equitable matter, that plaintiffs' and defendants' relative ingenuity in forum-shopping and forum-avoiding should not determine which side
prevails. Second, the Framers reasonably may have concluded that
an integrated judicial system would provide an important adhesive
among the various states. Under this analysis, the Framers insisted
on such a system at least in part because they saw it as an essential
reminder to the states that, though separate in many ways, they
are above all integral parts of a nation that frequently must act as
16 5
one.
The basic problem with this argument as to the framers' original understanding is that it ignores history. The framers could not
have intended the full faith and credit clause to operate as a limit on
the power of state courts to make choice-of-law decisions, because at
the time of the adoption of the Constitution, the concept of choice of
law simply did not exist in this country.
At the time of the adoption of the Constitution, no common law
of conflicts had been received from England, because no conflicts law
existed there. In all cases coming before the English courts only
English law was applied. It was not until the latter part of the eighteenth century that the English courts even considered displacing
English law in such a case. 66 Similarly, at the time of the adoption
164. Simson, supra note 3, at 66.
165. Id. at 67-68 (footnotes omitted).
166. See Sedler, Babcock v. Jackson in Kentucky: Judicial Method and the Policy-

Centered Conflict of Laws, 56 Ky. L.J. 27, 34-35 (1967). Professor Morris has observed:
It was not until the eighteenth century, when the common law courts extended their
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of the Constitution, differences between the laws of sister states in
this country must have been exceedingly rare because of a nearly
uniform common law.1 1 7 Thus, the framers of the Constitution were,
in all likelihood, not cognizant of any concept of choice of law. If
they gave any thought at all to the law that should be applied by a
state court in interstate cases, they most likely would have assumed
they should apply the law of the forum as the English courts had
done in international cases.168 Whatever else the framers intended to
accomplish by the promulgation of the full faith and credit clause, it
is apparent that they did not intend the clause to operate to control
state court choice-of-law decisions.169
No justification for interpreting the full faith and credit clause
as a constitutional control on state court choice-of-law decisions can
be found in the clause's broad, organic purpose or in its function in
our constitutional scheme. The purpose and function of a constitutional provision may be ascertained from its textual language and
structural position in the Constitution, as well as from the historical
circumstances surrounding its adoption. In addition to the full faith
and credit clause, article IV, the "federalism" article, includes a provision prohibiting discrimination against the citizens of sister
states,17 0 and one requiring the United States to guarantee to each
state a "republican form of government." 17' Read together, the provisions of article IV and the historical circumstances surrounding
their adoption, 7 2 seem to indicate quite clearly that the broad, orjurisdiction to cases involving a foreign element, and when the law merchant which
has formerly been applied in these cases, became a part of English domestic law,
that the need for rules of the conflict of laws arose in England, and the working out
of the doctrines now prevalent is essentially the work of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
Id. at 35 (quoting A. DicEy, CONFLICT OF LAWS 5 (6th ed. J. Morris 1949)).
167. See A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 4 (1962).
168. See id. at 5; Sedler, supra note 166, at 34-35.
169. The limited available historical evidence shows that the framers intended that the
full faith and credit clause opeate only to require recognition of the judgments of sister state
courts and of legislative acts of insolvency. See Reese & Johnson, The Scope of Full Faithand
Credit to Judgments, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 153, 153-55 (1949).
170. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 2, cl.
1. This provision is referred to as the "comity" clause,
and its essential thrust has been to prevent unreasonable discrimination against residents of
sister states. Compare Baldwin v. Montana Fish and Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978)
with Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978). As to the comity clause as a possible limitation
on choice of law, see discussion in note 4 supra.
171. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 4. As to the nature and operation of the guaranty clause,
see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217-28 (1962).
172. Clauses 2 and 3 of article IV, section 2, deal with extradition and fugitive slaves.
Clause 1 of article IV, section 3, deals with the admission of new states, and forbids the
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ganic purpose of the full faith and credit clause was to promote
equality among the states and respect for the sovereignty of each
state in the federal system. 7 3 In light of this purpose, the Supreme
Court has quite properly interpreted the full faith and credit clause
as precluding one state from discriminating against the laws of another state, and requiring that each state enforce, without discrimination, claims existing under the laws of a sister state.17 4 Likewise,

in light of this broad, organic purpose, the Supreme Court has again
quite properly interpreted the full faith and credit clause as imposing
virtually no limits on the power of state courts to make choice-of-law
decisions.17 5
An essential attribute of state sovereignty in our federal system
is the authority of the states under their police power to prescribe
the controlling law in civil litigation. 76 This attribute of state sovereignty includes the power of each state to decide when its own law
formation of any new state within any existing state or of any new state from all or part of two
other states. Clause 2 of article IV, section 3, deals with the disposition of federal property,
and does not appear to have a federalism component.
173. The full faith and credit clause and the comity clause may be seen as parallel "nondiscrimination" clauses, in the sense that the full faith and credit clause forbids discrimination
against sister-state judgments, laws and public acts, while the comity clause forbids discrimination against citizens of sister states. The extradition provision requires one state to facilitate
another state's enforcement of its criminal law. The restrictions on the formation of new states
contained in section 3, and the guaranty clause of section 4 impose certain obligations on the
federal government with respect to the states. All of this adds up to a structural constitutional
recognition of the states as sovereign equals in our federal system.
174. Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951). Since a state is not discriminating against
claims existing under the laws of sister states by applying the same statute of limitations to bar
such claims as it applies to bar claims existing under its own law, the forum may apply its
statute of limitations to bar a suit under sister-state law. Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345
U.S. 514 (1953).
175. For the strongest rejections of full faith and credit as a constitutional control on
state choice-of-law decisions, see Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 73
(1954); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 501-04
(1939). Since Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932), has been apparently
overruled by Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955), and John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936), has been explained in due process terms, see discussion in notes
146-51 supra and accompanying text, the only case supporting full faith and credit as an
independent limitation on choice of law is Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe,
331 U.S. 586, 589-99 (1947), which is of dubious vitality today. See discussion in notes 38,
157-161 supra and accompanying text.
176. For a discussion of this point, see Sedler, Book Review (to be published in Northwestern University Law Review). Regard for this attribute of state sovereignty has caused the
Supreme Court to limit the circumstances in which the federal courts can create "federal
common law" to displace state law in civil litigation. See generally M. REDISH, FEDERAL
JURISDICTION

79-107 (1980).
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applies to a case containing a foreign element.17 7 Since the broad,
organic purpose of the full faith and credit clause is to promote
equality among the states and respect for the sovereignty of each
state in the federal system, it would be anomalous and inconsistent
for the Court to interpret it to require that one state yield this attribute of sovereignty to another state because the latter state had a
greater interest in controlling the outcome of a particular case. To
put it another way, the notion that one state can have a greater interest than another in the exercise of sovereignty reflected in the application of its substantive law in civil litigation, is inconsistent with
the broad, organic purpose of the full faith and credit clause which
was designed to maintain the states as sovereign equals in our federal system.
The sovereign equality of the states in our federal system properly requires the reciprocal enforcement of sister-state judgments
and properly requires the non-discriminatory enforcement of claims
existing under the laws of sister states. It also, however, precludes
interference with the power of a state court to apply its own law
simply because it is asserted that another state has a greater interest
in applying its law.
The values embodied in the full faith and credit clause dictate
that each state, acting in its sovereign capacity, must decide for itself
whether it is interested in applying its own law to a case that is
before its courts. The Supreme Court has stated:
While the purpose of that provision was to preserve rights acquired or confirmed under the public acts and judicial proceedings
of one state by requiring recognition of their validity in other
states, the very nature of the federal union of states, to which are
reserved some of the attributes of sovereignty, precludes resort to
the full faith and credit clause as the means for compelling a state
to substitute the statutes of other states for its own statutes dealing
matter concerning which it is competent to
with a 17subject
8
legislate.
Since an attribute of state sovereignty is the power to prescribe,
whether by statute or judicial decision, the scope of the application
of its own law, a choice of law by a state court ordinarily is not a
177. In this sense the forum court is exercising the sovereignty of the state when it
decides that the forum's law shall apply to the case before it, in the same manner as the
legislature would be exercising the state's sovereignty by the enactment of a choice-of-law
directive.
178. Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n., 306 U.S. at 501.
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violation of full faith and credit. From the perspective of constitutional generalism, the Supreme Court's interpretation of the full
faith and credit clause as embodying such a principle is mandated by
the broad, organic purpose of the clause and its function in our constitutional scheme.
The only full faith and credit limitation on the power of a state
court to make choice-of-law decisions that can properly be imposed,
consistent with the clause's broad, organic purpose, is the very narrow one recognized by Justice Stevens in Hague. As Justice Stevens
noted, the full faith and credit clause, among other constitutional
provisions, is "designed to transform the several States from independent sovereignties into a single, unified Nation. 17 9 Where the action of a state court in applying its own law instead of the law of a
sister state threatens the federal interest in national unity, it is consistent with the broad, organic purpose of the full faith and credit
clause to hold that the interest in national unity prevails. The circumstances, however, in which the federal interest in national unity
will be impaired by the decision of a state court to apply its own law
in civil litigation involving private parties, are exceedingly rare. In
Supreme Council of the Royal Arcanum v. Green,1 80 a case involving the now obsolete matter of deficiency assessments against members of fraternal benefit associations, it may be argued that the federal interest in national unity dictated that a single law apply to
determine the validity of the assessments. If the deficiency assessments could be valid in some states and invalid in others, the association could not effectively function on a national basis. The Supreme
Court observed:
The contradiction in terms is apparent which would rise from holding on the one hand that there was a collective and unified standard of duty and obligation on the part of the members themselves
and the corporation, and saying on the other hand that the duty of
members was to be tested isolatedly and individually by resorting
not to one source of authority applicable to all but by applying
many divergent, variable and conflicting criteria. 181
In this case then, the application of the law of the state of incorporation to determine the validity of the deficiency assessment was mandated not because that state had a "greater interest" in having its
179.
180.
181.

449 U.S. at 322 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
237 U.S. 531 (1915).
Id. at 542.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1981

41

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1981], Art. 4
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10:59

law applied on the point in issue than the member's home state, but
because the federal interest in national unity required the application
of a uniform law, and the most appropriate law for that purpose was
the law of the state of incorporation.
This rationale, however, would not require the application of the
law of the state of incorporation in a case such as Order of United
Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe,18 2 and similar cases,183 where the
matter in issue was not the validity of an assessment against the
member, but the rights of the member against the association. In
Wolfe, the charter of the association provided for a built-in limitations period for the assertion of claims.' The provision was valid
under the law of the state of incorporation, but invalid under the law
of the member's home state. 85 The ability of the association to function on a national level would not be impaired if it could invoke the
built-in limitations period to defeat the claims of some members, but
not others. Thus, no federal interest in national unity dictating that a
single law apply on the issue of the validity of the built-in limitations
period exists in this case, and the application of the law of the member's home state on this issue should not be violative of full faith and
credit. It is difficult to posit any siutations likely to arise in practice
today where the federal interest in a national unity would require the
application of a uniform law.
Beyond the very narrow limitation suggested by Justice Stevens
in Hague, the full faith and credit clause, when viewed from the
perspective of constitutional generalism, should not operate at all to
limit the power of state courts to make choice-of-law decisions.
CONCLUSION

This article has analyzed the matter of constitutional limitations
on choice of law from the perspective of constitutional generalism.
Utilizing general principles of constitutional interpretation and the
consistent application of constitutional doctrine as guidelines, it has
been demonstrated that neither the due process clause nor the full
faith and credit clause places any significant limitations on the
power of state courts to make choice-of-law decisions. 8 It has also
182, 331 U.S. 586 (1947).
183. Sovereign Camp of the Woodmen of the World v. Bolin, 305 U.S. 66 (1938);
Modern Woodmen of Am. v. Mixer, 267 U.S. 544 (1925).
184. 331 U.S. at 588 n.2.
185. Id. at 588-89.
186. We have not considered, from the perspective of constitutional generalism, whether
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been demonstrated that a similar result should follow from the operational test, formulated in the Brennan and Stevens opinions in
Hague for determining the constitutionality of a state court's choice
of law. This is as it should be, and in our constitutional system, there
should not be any significant constitutional limitations on choice of
187
law.

constitutional limitations on choice of law might be found to inhere in the comity clause and
the equal protection clause, as suggested by Brainerd Currie, or in the commerce clause, as
suggested by Professor Horowitz. See B. CuRIE, supra note 4; Horowitz, The Commerce
Clause as a Limitation on State Choice-of-Law Doctrine, 84 HARV. L. REV. 806 (1971). I
consider it highly unlikely that the Supreme Court will find such limitations inhering in the
comity clause or the equal protection clause. See Sedler, supra note 4. I also believe that it is
difficult to see how a state court choice-of-law decision could be found to discriminate against
interstate commerce in favor of local commerce or to place an undue burden on interstate
commerce. See discussion in note 110 supra.
187. While most of my Constitutional Law colleagues will agree with this conclusion, I
strongly suspect that most of my Conflict of Laws colleagues will not.
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